Studying foreign direct investment is also fundamentally linked to examining property transformation in post-socialist Europe and thus to an 1 Foreign direct investment (FDI) is investment made by a company in the investor country into a foreign, host country. It can take a form of acquisition of already existing host firms or establishment of new companies in the host country, referred to as greenfield investment. FDI is a crucial medium through which national economies become inter-connected on a global basis.
investigation about a creation of capitalism. In this paper, I draw on my findings about the processes of foreign direct investment in Central and Eastern Europe after 1989 to begin charting a territory for an analysis of the varieties of capitalism in post-socialist Europe. I suggest that the role of states in and the interweaving of political power and economy, presence of informality in economic sphere, and influence of foreign investors as property owners, characterize the capitalist arrangements in Central and Eastern Europe. However, these factors are differentially prominent in individual countries (or clusters of countries), contributing to varieties of post-socialist capitalism.
Varieties of Capitalism
Marx and Weber were concerned with the origins and character of modern capitalism, assuming that the destination was given and singular.
Economists in the neo-classical tradition coming to Eastern Europe right after 1989, proposing grand plans for re-design of institutions, likewise assumed that there is one destination to capitalism, and one best way to get there.
In contrast, contemporary sociological examinations of capitalist institutions begin with the observation that there are different paths leading towards capitalism. These do not only depend on the endowments of economic actors but also on institutionalized patterns of authority and organizational logics, which are historically developed and resistant to change. "Institutional blueprints guide which actors are constituted as legitimate economic participants, and how they relate to each other as well as to the state. States also are a product of history and may have different legitimate roles in economic decision making across societies" (Biggart and Guillen 1999: 740) .
Thus, networked small business firms might be the core pattern of economic organization in Taiwan, chaebol based on patrimonial principle in South Korea, and foreign multinationals linked to international technology and marketing channels in Spain.
The debate over societal foundations of economic organization is also present in political science. It probably has its foundations in Ronald Dore's (1989) analysis of the British and Japanese factories, but was revived by Michel Albert (1993) who identified two variants of contemporary capitalism: "Anglo-American" and "Nippo-Rhenish" models (Berger 2000) . His research was followed by several studies examining the specificities of the German, Japanese, French, and other national models (Berger and Dore 1996; Couch and Streeck 1997; Hall and Soskice 2001; Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997; Soskice 1991 Soskice , 1999 Streeck 1992) . The underlying premise of these studies is that firms (as well as other economic arrangements such as capital markets) are "social institutions, not just networks of private contracts or the property of their shareholders. Their internal order is a matter of public interest and is subject to extensive social regulation, by law and industrial agreement" (Crouch and Streeck 1997:37) . National markets then differ systematically according to the kinds of resources and frameworks that the national models provide.
For Soskice (1999) , the basic differentiating factor is institutional configuration of production regime, which is defined by four patterns: 1. the sets of rules and institutions regulating the industrial-relations system, 2. the educational and training system, 3. the relations among companies, and 4. the system of corporate governance and finance. In Soskice's categories, there are two broad types of production regimes: business-coordinated market economies (e.g. Germany, Japan, Korea, Sweden) and liberal market economies (e.g. the United States and Britain). Overall, contributors to the varieties of capitalism literature hold that the different institutional configurations, or production regimes, generate systematically different economic performances and allow countries to pursue multiple paths to economic development.
Varieties of Capitalism in Post-Socialist Europe
Although not directly responding to the varieties of capitalism literature, several scholars of post-socialist transformations have advocated variability in the transformations, rather than a monolithic transition, to capitalisms in Central and Eastern Europe. The researchers identified several different types of capitalisms emerging in Central and Eastern Europe: a distinct form based on recombinant property (Stark 1996) , political capitalism (Staniskiz 1991), and "capitalism without capitalists" (Eyal et al. 1998 995), akin to economic organization in Asia. In a later version of that argument, in a book with Laszlo Bruszt, the authors explain: "Defying the forced dichotomy of market versus hierarchy, [actors in post-socialism] create new property forms that blur the boundaries of public and private, blur the organizational boundaries of firms, and blur the boundaries of the legitimating principles through which they claim stewardship of economic resources" (Stark and Bruszt 1998: 7) .
While widely accepted within the academic circles, Stark's thesis also generated criticism. Fligstein (1996) takes up Stark's argument that the specific form of cross-institutional ownership is akin to the economic organization in Asian societies and points out that Stark "only draws out one line of that thought: the fact that Asian firms seem to have unique social structures that he characterizes as networks. But he ignores the great variation in those structures and how they work. He also ignores that states have played interesting and complex roles in the generation of these social structures" (Fligstein 1996 (Fligstein : 1080 .
In a more forceful critique, along the lines identified by Fligstein, Hanley, King and Janos (2002) Table 1 ). By 2000, in some East European countries, Hungary included, the private sector share in GDP is at 80 percent, which is comparable to that in the United States (Tanzi 1999). In contrast, some other countries, while decreasing state ownership substantially after 1989, have nevertheless maintained relatively large state sectors. Therefore, continued state ownership may be one source of variation in economic arrangements across the region. This variation also has implications for the recombinant property thesis. It is more likely that, ceteris paribus, the blurring of boundaries between private and public will be present in a society with larger state sector, such as Slovenia, Croatia, Latvia and Romania. Tracing how post-socialist states yield to external pressures, my study is in line with others proposing that integration into global and regional markets has diminished the regulatory autonomy of post-socialist states (Amsden, Kochanowicz, Taylor 1994) . At the same time, these findings go against the research in economic sociology doubting that globalization exerts significant convergence pressures on domestic economies (Fligstein 2001 , Guillen 2001 ). To consolidate these findings, I suggest that we need to allow for the possibility that some states may not preserve their unique institutional arrangements, because they are in a structurally weak position, or because they are in the period of institutional re-building and the global world society is a source of legitimate models (Meyer et al. 1997 ), or both.
But while I find clear evidence for the convergence of institutions at the level of states (Meyer et al. 1997) , the empirical evidence is also strong for the differentiation between the formal institutions and the actual economic activity in practice. The presence of informality in transforming East European economies looms large. I find that while we can trace a significant change in formal institutions adopted by post-socialist states, the informal logics of practice retain vestiges of the socialist past, where the formal features of a command economy with a centralized allocation were in practice complemented by a set of informal reciprocity arrangements that helped firms maintain production despite shortages (Kornai 1992) . Moreover, because of general bureaucracy of the system, which could not satisfy all social needs, informal mechanisms were used to compensate for it (Lomnitz 1988 ). The post-socialist societies thus face a challenge of reforming not only formal but also informal institutions. And as Douglass North stated, "While the rules may be changed overnight, the informal norms usually change only gradually. Since it is the norms that provide "legitimacy" to a set of rules, revolutionary change is never as revolutionary as its supporters desire and performance will be different than anticipated. And economies that adopt the formal rules of another economy will have very different performance characteristics than the first economy because of different informal norms and enforcement." (North 1993) What we see in Eastern Europe is the simultaneity of convergence and divergence in globalization outcomes. Whether increasing international movement of capital, people and culture makes the world more homogenous, is one of the key issues in globalization studies, but much empirical work conducted on the subject has found divergent results. My study contributes to this literature by substantiating that global processes encourage both convergence and divergence. This is in line with Zelizer's (1999) proposition that, the economy operates at two levels: seen from the top, economic transactions connect with broad national symbolic meanings and institutions. Seen from the bottom, economic transactions are highly differentiated, personalized and local, meaningful to particular relations. No contradiction therefore exists between uniformity and diversity; they are simply two different aspects of the same transaction. (Zelizer, 1999: 212) Moreover, Guillen (2001a: 235) identifies that, in fact, the divergent findings in globalization studies are "primarily due to the various levels of analysis at which different researchers operate". To deal with this issue, my study examined both the national level policies and organizational practices.
Therefore, it did not only illuminate how homogenization and diversification happen concurrently but it also identified decoupling as the process that sustains their simultaneity. While foreign ownership of strategic assets is a by-product of the simultaneity of the regional transformation with the rise in neoliberal pressures of international organization and globalization, still not all of East European economies are equally penetrated by foreign investment. The degree of such penetration may be a source of another variation in the types of capitalisms consolidating in these countries. Which economies are more highly subject to FDI? As empirical analyses point out it is not merely the economic and political stability of those countries that matters. Overtime flows are mostly subject to the choices made about property reform in the first formative years of transformation. Indeed, privatization strategies employed in Central and Eastern Europe showed tremendous diversity, ranging from direct sales for cash by auctions or tenders; management and employee buyouts (MEBOs); voucher schemes whereby citizens acquired coupons for a small price, which they subsequently exchanged for shares in companies; or programs of citizen grants, whereby a segment of the population or sometimes every citizen was awarded some number of free certificates, which they could exchange for property rights. The examination of property-rights transformations in a broadly comparative perspective is highly consequential for claims about the variety of capitalism emerging in Central and Eastern Europe, including the political capitalism thesis (Staniszkis 1991 , Hankiss 1990 ) and argument about transition to capitalism without capitalists (Eyal, Szelenyi and Townsley 1998) . According to Staniszkis, early privatization in Poland "was not a result of the expansion of the traditional private sector, but was a peculiar linkage of political power and capital" (1991: 128). Staniszkis reports that in 1987, there were 80 firms owned by the communist party officials and by 1990, just a month after the first post-socialist noncommunist Prime Minister Mazowiecki initiated economic reforms, there were more than 40,000.
According to Staniszkis, this illustrates that the process of privatization benefited the former communist elite. The former nomenklatura used its political power to enact privatization laws that enabled them to convert their former positions into new forms of post-communist privilege, and thus private wealth. The result was a creation of "political capitalism."
In their examination of transition to capitalism in Central Europe, Eyal, Szelenyi and Townsley (1998) has not yet taken its full shape and this has its liabilities. Beyond this caveat, however, the limits to all of the propositions about the varieties of capitalism in Eastern Europe lie in the lack of (or narrowness of) their comparative approach. Quite paradoxically, while recognizing the variety of "post-socialist pathways," these studies still make claims about a unique variety (not varieties) of post-socialist capitalism in Central and Eastern Europe.
In contrast to these studies, the embedded economies approach to the varieties of capitalism implies that to determine a distinct quality of the system of economic institutions in Eastern Europe (or lack thereof), we need to examine how states, pre-existing institutions, international organizations, cultural understandings and actions of political and economic elites promote a unique blend of property rights, governance structures and rules of exchange. Moreover, examining substantive varieties of embeddedness, this approach allows for the possibility that there is not only one variety of East European capitalism, but that the variation across individual countries (or clusters of countries) within the region is substantial. What may be some points of similarity and sources of difference across the region?
All the post-socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe shared a particular state-socialist past of centralized economy with communist party rule. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, these countries started reforming their economic and political regimes, establishing institutions necessary for market exchange and democratic governments. Although many Western analysts have come to the region right after 1989 with advice on how to re-vamp the economic arrangements so markets can emerge, in hindsight it was rather unrealistic to expect that the transformations that took decades in other parts of the world, would arise in a matter of a few years. Primarily, this was because the mere presence of rational self-interested actors and the absence of party-state interference were not sufficient for markets to emerge. In fact, the notion of emerging markets carries the bias of neoclassical theory.
Markets needed to be created, because they can operate only when the required political, legal, economic and social institutions of a market economy exist. This market creation was carried out by political entities: new parties, new governments, new nation-states with their privatization and economic restructuring agencies. Because of these historical conditions, the role of politics and political influences on economic activities (sometimes in terms of converting ex-communists into the new bourgeoisie in a "political capitalism" manner) may be generally more pronounced in the post-socialist countries than in Western developed economies.
Beside the fact that the reforms were implemented very quickly, the basic outlines of institutions in Central and Eastern Europe were also being laid down in a specific context of increased economic integration on a global scale and rising legitimacy of the neoliberal discourse carried by international agencies, such as the IMF, World Bank, or UN Conference on Trade and Development. These pressures created particular conditions in which liberalization of economies needed to happen simultaneously with the creation of market institutions. Thus, the foreign capital might be more prevalent in all of the post-socialist countries than it would have been should the transition occur in a different historical period.
In addition, almost all Central and East European states, upon the fall of communism, set out to join the regional association of the European Union.
The application for membership involved re-forming their emerging institutions along the lines of the aquis communitaire, the EU legislation.
The new institutional arrangements were thus implemented from outside and sometimes did not reflect the political will of a country. This leaves a possibility that formal rule in post-socialism will be substantially decoupled from the actual practice and that the level of informality and thus the size of the informal economy may have a substantial role in all of these countries.
Beside these similarities, which provided the broad context for transition, the specific circumstances of each of the Central and East European countries may create substantive varieties in their post-socialist economic arrangements. The broad contextual forces will be mediated by these countries' histories before and during state-socialism, their pre-existing institutions, their national cultures and current political structures and domestic interests. All of these forces will contribute to a variety of outcomes in economic organization. percent of all employed were still in the public sector, while in Estonia this number was one third lower. Inflation rate is higher in Slovenia, but unemployment is higher in Estonia. Unionization rate in Slovenia is about 40 percent while less than 15 percent of Estonian workforce is unionized (Table   2 ). In spite of these differences, both countries offer a good standard of living to its people, and both are among the most economically successful of the transition countries invited to join the EU in May 2004. The fact that both Estonia and Slovenia have restructured their economies successfully but in very different ways, resulting in two substantially different social organizations of economies, implies that there is no one way of market organization that produces more efficient outcomes (Orru, Biggart and Hamilton 1997 , Biggart and Guillen 1999 , Fligstein 2001 , Guillen 2001b . This research advances the economic sociology by proposing a conceptual framework that accounts for the multi-dimensionality of social forces that structure economic action. It argues for an investigation of substantive varieties of embeddedness at micro and macro-levels. Examining the creation and operation of markets in post-socialist Central and Eastern Europe, the dissertation also contributes to a comparative study of capitalisms.
